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SATISFACTION NOT GUARANTEED:
CALIFORNIA'S CONFLICTING LAW ON THE
USE OF ACCORD AND SATISFACTION
CHECKS
Bryan D. Hull* & Aalok Sharma**
The law wisely favors settlements, and where there is a real
and genuine contest between the parties, and a settlement is
had without fraud or misrepresentation, for an amount de-
termined upon as a compromise between the conflicting
claims, such settlement should be upheld, although such
amount is materially less than the amount claimed by the
person to whom it is paid. 1
* Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. B.A. 1979, J.D.
1982, University of California, Los Angeles. This article expands upon and
updates a short article I wrote for the Los Angeles County Bar Association
Commercial Law and Bankruptcy Section newsletter entitled "Can 't Get No
Satisfaction": The Exasperating California Law on Use of Accord and Satis-
faction Checks, L.A. County Bar Commercial Law and Bankruptcy Section
Newsletter 1 (Summer 1998). I would like to express what a pleasure it was
for me to work with Aalok Sharma on this project and to have worked with
him both as a student and as my research assistant In a poem by one Glennice
Harmon in the NEA Journal many years ago entitled "They Ask Me Why I
Teach," the answer given by the poet was "Where could I find more splendid
company?" In my years of teaching, I have found that statement to be very
true, and Aalok is definitely among the splendid company of former students
that I now consider to be my good friends.
** Associate, White & Case, Los Angeles. B.A. 1995, University of
Washington. J.D. 1999, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. I would like to
thank Professor Bryan Hull for inspiring me first as my Contracts professor,
then acting as my mentor throughout my law school experience, then for giv-
ing me the opportunity to work with him on this article, and finally for his
friendship and encouragement I would also like to thank my mother and fa-
ther, Krishna and Tilak Sharma, for their love, inspiration, and guidance
throughout my life. A special thanks to the editors and staff of the Loyola of
Los Angeles Law Review for their meticulous editorial efforts. Finally, I wish
to thank my new bride, Nicole, for her love, patience, and friendship.
1. Potter v. Pacific Coast Lumber Co., 37 Cal. 2d 592, 602-03, 234 P.2d
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I. NTRODUCTION
The late Professor Grant Gilmore once described the first year
of law school as akin to a "guided tour through hell."'2 There are in-
deed many horrifying sights (or is it cites?) of uncertainty that the
lawyer-to-be encounters in the first year curriculum, particularly in
Contracts class.
One area that typically gives first year law students difficulty,
and gives trouble to practicing lawyers as well, is the area involving
settlement of claims, or accord and satisfaction. There are several
difficult questions to analyze in the area. To what extent is consid-
eration required to support a release of a claim? Is it necessary that
there be a reasonable dispute over the amount owed in order for a
release of a claim to be binding, or is it only necessary for the party
seeking the release to be acting in good faith? May a recipient of an
accord and satisfaction check (sometimes called a "payment in full"
check) cross out the "payment in full" language, cash the check, and
then sue for the balance of the claim?
The difficulty for students, and perhaps more so for practicing
lawyers, is that there are many conflicting court decisions and stat-
utes on these issues which make it hard, if not impossible, to analyze
fact patterns and give certain answers and advice to clients. One
must research the law of the relevant state and try to determine how
that state's courts or statutes deal with accord and satisfaction issues.
Analysis of these issues is particularly difficult in California be-
cause there are conflicting statutes on the issue of whether a recipient
of an accord and satisfaction check can strike the payment in full
language before negotiating the check and thus preserve the recipi-
ent's claim against the drawer of the check. California Civil Code
section 1526 permits the recipient of the check to strike the release
language in most cases and cash the check, thus preserving the re-
cipient's claim. On the other hand, California Commercial Code
sections 1207 and 3311 require the recipient of a payment in full
check issued in good faith to make a choice: either negotiate the
16, 22 (1951).
2. GRANT GILMORE, Introduction and Teaching Notes from Teacher's
Manual, in CONTRACTS (Friedrich Kessler & Grant Gilmore eds., 2d ed.
1970), reprinted in PETER LNzER, A CONTRACTS ANTHOLOGY 39, 41 (2d ed.
1995).
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check and release the claim or return the check to the person who is-
sued the check and preserve the clain.
This Article critically examines the current state of the law of
accord and satisfaction checks in California. Part II outlines the
common law doctrine of accord and satisfaction. Part III discusses
the legislative enactments in California dealing with accord and sat-
isfaction checks--UCC sections 1-207 and 3-311 and Civil Code
section 1526-and illustrates how these enactments have muddied up
the relatively clear common law doctrine. This section presents the
current conflict in California regarding accord and satisfaction
checks. Part IV considers rules of statutory construction, reviews
relevant case law, and addresses public policy arguments in deter-
mining which of the conflicting statutes-UCC sections 1-207 and 3-
311 or Civil Code section 1526-should govern. Part V concludes
that the Commercial Code statutes should govern; if anything, they
may not go far enough in facilitating settlements. The recipient of a
payment in full check offered in good faith settlement of a bona fide
disputed or unliquidated claim should not be allowed to cross out the
payment in full language, negotiate the check, and sue for the bal-
ance the recipient believes to be due. The bottom line, however, is
that before lawyers can advise recipients of payment in full checks
with certainty, either the legislature must act (preferably by repealing
Civil Code section 1526) or the California Supreme Court must de-
cide which of the inconsistent statutes govern.
II. THE COMMON LAW DocmINE OF ACCORD AND SAISFACTION
The common law 3 defines an accord and satisfaction as a con-
tract between a debtor and a creditor for the settlement of a disputed
or unliquidated debt by some performance other than payment in
full. 4  Accord and satisfaction discharges the previously existing
3. The common law discussion deals with the law governing accord and
satisfaction before adoption of California Civil Code section 1526 and Revised
Uniform Commercial Code § 3-311 and assumes that pre-revision UCC § 1-
207 did not apply. For a discussion of that issue, see infra notes 57-88 and ac-
companying text.
4. See Jay Winston, The Evolution of Accord and Satisfaction: Common
Law; U.C.C. Section 1-207; U.C.C. Section 3-311, 28 NEW ENG. L. REv. 189,
191 (1993).
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contractual right or obligation and serves as an affirmative defense in
an action to enforce the previously existing contract claim 5
Because an accord serves as a substitute to the original contract
between the parties, 6 it must therefore satisfy the requirements of
contract formation-offer, acceptance, and consideration 7 -before
this partial payment serves to discharge the obligation. 8
A payment in full9 check is the offer of an accord. California
courts generally allow the offer to enter into an accord to be stated on
the check itself or on some accompanying memorandum'i The
statement must be appropriately worded, such as "payment in full,"
and conspicuously noted such that it is clear that this check is in-
tended to resolve the dispute." If the check contains this payment in
full language, the creditor is said to be on notice of the accord
whether or not the creditor had actual knowledge.12 For example, in
5. See Michaela White, Does U.C.C. Section 1-207 Apply to the Doctrine
of Accord and Satisfaction by Conditional Check?, 11 CREIGHTON L. REv.
515, 515-16 (1977-78).
6. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 281 (1981).
(1) An accord is a contract under which an obligee promises to accept
a stated performance in satisfaction of the obligor's existing duty.
Performance of the accord discharges the original duty.
(2) Until performance of the accord, the original duty is suspended
unless there is such a breach of the accord by the obligor as discharges
the new duty of the obligee to accept the performance in satisfaction.
If there is such a breach, the obligee may enforce either the original
duty or any duty under the accord.
(3) Breach of the accord by the obligee does not discharge the original
duty, but the obligor may maintain a suit for specific performance of
the accord, in addition to any claim for damages for partial breach.
Id.
7. See Winston, supra note 4, at 191-92.
8. See Scott J. Burnham, Accord and Satisfaction in California: A Trap for
the Unwary, 30 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 473, 474 (1990).
9. The payment in full check has also been referred to as a conditioned
check, a conditional check, or a full payment check. See Robinson v. Garcia,
804 S.W.2d 238, 241 n.2 (Tex. App. 1991, writ denied).
10. See Burnham, supra note 8, at 476.
11. See Winston, supra note 4, at 192; see also Potter v. Pacific Coast
Lumber Co., 37 Cal. 2d 592, 597, 234 P.2d 16, 18 (1951) (debtor must make it
clear that acceptance of what he tenders is subject to the condition that it shall
be in full satisfaction).
12. See Burnham, supra note 8, at 476-77.
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Newsom v. Woollacott,13 the plaintiff cashed a check for partial pay-
ment that was written by the defendant. 14 On the check was the
statement, "'In full for 9t1 and Grand Ave. fees." ' 15 The jury deter-
mined that the check did not constitute an accord and satisfaction and
therefore the plaintiff received a judgment for the balance of his
claim.16 However, the court of appeal reversed, holding that, unless
the plaintiff controverted it, he was presumed to have knowledge of
the writing.' 7 Thus, once plaintiff cashed the check, he was bound
by the terms of the instrument, and as a result he effectively dis-
charged the balance of the claim.' 8
Similarly, in Potter v. Pacific Coast Lumber Co.,19 the plaintiff
sought to recover the balance due under contracts for the sale of three
carloads of lumber.20 The defendants pleaded an accord and satis-
faction as an affirmative defense. 21 A bona fide dispute22 arose as to
the amount due under the contracts.23 In an attempt to resolve the
dispute, the defendants sent checks for partial payment to the plain-
tiff and attached vouchers to each check informing the plaintiff that
the checks were intended as full settlement of the disputed claim.
24
The trial court found that the plaintiffs acceptance of the check did
not constitute an accord and satisfaction.2 ' The California Supreme
Court reversed.26 It reasoied that the plaintiff's acceptance and
cashing of the checks pursuant to their conditional terms of "full set-
tlement" constituted an accord and satisfaction as a matter of law.27
13. 5 Cal. App. 722, 91 P. 347 (1907).
14. See id. at 724, 91 P. at 347.
15. Id.
16. Seeid.
17. See id. at 725, 91 P. at 348.
18. See id. at 726,91 P. at 348.
19. 37 Cal. 2d 592, 234 P.2d 16 (1951).
20. See id. at 594,234 P.2d at 17.
21. See id.
22. See infra notes 3 7-54 and accompanying text
23. See Potter, 37 Cal. 2d at 595-96, 234 P.2d at 17-18.
24. See id. at 596, 234 P.2d at 18.
25. See id. at 594,234 P.2d at 17.
26. See id. at 603,234 P.2d at 22.
27. See id.
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Just as the accord constitutes the offer of a payment in full
check, satisfaction occurs when the creditor accepts the accord. 5
The debtor must make it clear that the creditor's acceptance of the
check is subject to the condition that it is in full satisfaction of the
claim 2 9 In order for the accord to discharge the original obligation,
there must be an effective acceptance of the compromise offer.30 "A
subjective 'meeting of the minds' is not required, as the creditor's
acceptance of the check may be evidenced 'actually or by implica-
tion."''31 If the creditor accepts the check, the creditor is deemed to
have accepted the offer by cashing a full payment check or otherwise
exercising control over it.32 Just like any other offer, the offeree
must either accept the terms of the offer or reject them 33 A creditor
who crosses out the conditional language on the check or holds the
check for an unreasonable amount of time may be found to have ac-
cepted the settlement offer.34
28. See Winston, supra note 4, at 192.
29. See Teledyne Mid-America Corp. v. HOH Corp., 486 F.2d 987, 992
(9th Cir. 1973) (quoting Potter, 37 Cal. 2d at 597, 234 P.2d at 19).
This requirement is particularly stringent where past practices between
the debtor and creditor have involved installment payments on the
debt. In this situation the debtor bears the greater burden of demon-
strating that the creditor received adequate notice that a given payment
was tendered conditionally as final and not partial payment Where
this burden has not been met, the courts have refused to find an effec-
tive accord and satisfaction.
Id. at 992-93.
30. See id. at 993.
31. Id. (quoting Besco Enterprises, Inc. v. Carole, Inc., 274 Cal. App. 2d
42, 45, 78 Cal. Rptr. 645, 646 (1969)).
32. See Winston, supra note 4, at 192; see also Teledyne Mid-America, 486
F.2d at 993 ("[I]t is almost universally held that '[t]he cashing of the check or
its certification is sufficient an act of dominion to constitute such acceptance."'
(quoting Besco Enterprises, 274 Cal. App. 2d at 45, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 646) (sec-
ond alteration in Teledyne Mid-America, 486 F.2d at 993)).
33. See Burnham, supra note 8, at 478.
34. See id.
In Sheldon Builders, Inc. v. Trojan Towers, the court held that a
creditor who wishes to avoid the presumption that part payment has
been accepted must return the check. On the other hand, in Besco
Enterprises, Inc. v. Carole, Inc., the court held that the parties had not
entered an accord when the creditor kept the check but gave written
notice that "we cannot accept the check as presented."
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Teledyne Mid-America, 486 F.2d at 993-95.
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The extent to which consideration is required for a valid accord
and satisfaction has been heavily litigated over the years. It has been
argued that no consideration should be necessary to uphold an accord
and satisfaction as compared to an executory contract because the
person defending an accord and satisfaction is not trying to get a
court to force someone to affirmatively perform; just as lack of con-
sideration cannot be used to undo a completed gift, neither should it
be available to undo an accord and satisfaction.35 Nevertheless, the
traditional rule is that some form of consideration is necessary to en-
force a release of a claim the proverbial "horse, hawk or robe."
36
The truth of the matter is that unless some fraud or duress is in-
volved, a creditor agreeing to an accord and satisfaction is agreeing
to give up the balance of a claim in exchange for the forbearance on
the part of the debtor from making the creditor go to court. This is
valuable consideration indeed, considering the costs of pursuing
matters in court.
Many courts will uphold an accord and satisfaction, and say that
consideration exists, however, only if the debt is truly unliquidated
3 7
In Teledyne Mid-America, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, the trial court's holding
that the acceptance of the check constituted an accord and satisfaction. The
court held that the cashing of the check was not the event that triggered the ac-
cord. Rather, an accord was formed when the plaintiff failed to return the
check despite fully understanding the terms of the debtor's offer. See id. As
discussed later, there has been a split of authority under pre-revision UCC Ar-
ticle 3 as to whether a recipient of a payment in full check could delete the
payment in full language under the authority of pre-revisio.n § 1-207. See infra
notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
35. See 5A ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1240
(1964 & Supp. 1999). At common law, eight jurisdictions, including Califor-
nia, did not appear to require an unliquidated or disputed debt in order for the
doctrine of accord and satisfaction to apply. The other seven jurisdictions are
Arkansas, Georgia, Maine, Mississippi, New Hampshire, North Dakota, and
Virginia. See Winston, supra note 4, at 193 n.40; see, e.g., Harris v. EMI
Television Programs, Inc., 102 Cal. App. 3d 214, 219, 162 Cal. Rptr. 357, 360
(1980) ("[I]f the written instrument states an intention to discharge the debt,
then the debt is discharged whether it is disputed or not and regardless of the
amount paid in consideration of the release."' (citation omitted)).
36. Pinnel's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 237, 237 (C.P. 1600).
37. See 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON & WALTER H. E. JAEGER, A TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 128 (3d ed. 1957) ("An unliquidated claim is one,
the amount of which has not been fixed by agreement or cannot be exactly de-
termined by the application of rules of arithmetic or of law.").
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or disputed.3' This theory is based on the belief that the parties'
"willingness to compromise is in itself valuable consideration."39 At
times it may be difficult to determine whether a debt is liquidated.
The doctrine of account stated provides some guidance, stating that
"a debt may also become liquidated when it goes unchallenged by
the debtor for a period of time. '40 For example, assume that an at-
torney bills a client $1000 for services performed at an hourly rate of
$100. The client disputes the amount of the bill and the attorney ac-
cepts $800 in full satisfaction. The attorney has no claim for the bal-
ance because the obligation was unliquidated. However, "[i]f the bill
had been resubmitted for several months and had gone unpaid, then
under the doctrine of account stated it would tend to become
38. See White, supra note 5, at 516 n.9.
A claim is "unliquidated" or disputed when there is a bona fide con-
tention that the debtor is not liable for the full amount. Corbin de-
scribes several types of unliquidated claims: (1) where the original
claim had not been determined by agreement of the parties; (2) where
an amount per unit of performance has been agreed by the parties, but
the number of units to be performed has been undetermined; (3)
amount to be paid has been agreed but the duty to pay is dependent on
a questionable fact or event (4) where the method of payment is unas-
certained; (5) where the debtor asserts a reduction in a previously de-
cided amount because of a defective performance by the creditor.
Id. (citing 6 ARTHuRULNToN CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1290, at 166-
72 (1962)). But see Winston, supra note 4, at 193 n.40 (eight states do not
follow this rule). The Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 74 requires
that for release of a claim or defense to be consideration, either the claim or
defense must in fact be doubtful or the party asserting the claim and defense
must believe that it is valid. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 74
(1981).
39. White, supra note 5, at 516.
40. Burnham, supra note 8, at 475. The doctrine of account stated pro-
vides:
(1) An account stated is a manifestation of assent by debtor and
creditor to a stated sum as an accurate computation of an amount due
the creditor. A party's retention without objection for an unreasonably
long time of a statement of account rendered by the other party is a
manifestation of assent.
(2) The account stated does not itself discharge any duty but is an ad-
mission by each party of the facts asserted and a promise by the debtor
to pay according to its terms.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 282 (1981).
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liquidated at $1000 and [the $800 payment] would not discharge [the
balance]." 41
The honest dispute or unliquidated claim provides consideration
because the creditor is foregoing the right to sue for the full balance
in favor of settling the dispute out of court for a lesser amount.42 It
does not matter whether or not there is a solid foundation for the dis-
pute.43 The test is whether the dispute is honest or if the party re-
fusing to pay is acting in "bad faith." 44
Upper Avenue National Bank v. First Arlington National Bank45
illustrates the honest dispute requirement. The defendant, John Li-
vaditis, owned real property on which a K-Mart building was being
constructed.46 The defendant entered into a service contract with the
plaintiff, American Engineering, Inc., whereby the plaintiff was to
perform heating and air-conditioning services for the K-Mart build-
ing.47 The defendant ran into financial difficulties and induced the
plaintiff to accept a note for $13,515, the remaining amount due un-
der the contract, plus ten percent interest.48 Subsequently, the parties
entered into a release agreement whereby the defendant paid the
plaintiff $8000 in satisfaction of the claim. 49 The plaintiff then repu-
diated the settlement by filing suit to recover the remaining $5515
due under the contract.50
The court stated that "[t]he well-established general rule is that
an agreement to accept part payment of an amount undisputably [sic]
due is not satisfaction of the whole debt and will not bar recovery of
the balance unpaid."5' The court explained that the rationale behind
41. Burnham, supra note 8, at 476.
42. See Winston, supra note 4, at 193. If a debt is liquidated or undisputed,
then a payment of a lesser amount is insufficient consideration to discharge a
debt for more, unless something else ("a horse, or a canary, or a tomtit") is
thrown into the bargain. Couldery v. Bartrum, 19 Ch. D. 394, 399 (1881).
43. See B. & W. Eng'g Co. v. Beam, 23 Cal. App. 164, 171, 137 P. 624
(1913).
44. See id.
45. 400 N.E.2d 1105 (Ill. App. Ct 1980).
46. See id. at 1106.
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See id. at 1107.
50. See id.
51. Id. (emphasis added).
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this rule is that when an honest dispute does not exist, there is no
consideration supporting the agreement to discharge the entire debt
by paying a lesser amount than the amount actually due.5 2 In other
words, there must be an actual dispute between the parties in order to
furnish the necessary consideration to discharge the obligation.
53
Because the court found that a good faith dispute did not exist as to
the amount due, the defendant's release was invalid and the plaintiff
was allowed to recover the remaining balance.
5 4
In summary, while the requirement of consideration is some-
what nebulous, the common law rule regarding acceptance of accord
and satisfaction checks is rather clear. The common law gives a
creditor who receives a payment in full check two options: (1) reject
the offer by returning or destroying the check, thereby preserving the
right to sue for the balance the creditor believes due; or (2) cash the
check and accept the accord, thus releasing the balance of the
claim.55 Under the common law, the creditor could not avoid an ac-
cord and satisfaction by either reserving the creditor's rights on the
check or by crossing out the full settlement language on the check.
5 6
52. See id.
53. See id. at 1108.
54. See id. at 1107-08. The court noted that if the case had been decided
under the Uniform Commercial Code, § 1-107 would have obviated the con-
sideration requirement since there was a written, signed release of the claim.
See id. at 1107. The court probably viewed the underlying transaction between
the parties as a service contract There is no analysis as to whether the promis-
sory note was negotiable; if it were, Article 3 of the UCC would apply and the
case would have been decided differently.
55. See Winston, supra note 4, at 192; see also Susan Harrison Hendrick,
U. C. C. Section 1-207 and the Full Payment Check: The Struggle Between the
Code and the Common Law-Where Do the Debtor and Creditor Fit In?, 7 U.
DAYTON L. REv. 421, 424 (1982) (quoting Chancellor, Inc. v. Hamilton Ap-
pliance Co., 418 A.2d 1326, 1327 (N.J. Passaic County Ct. 1980)). A New
Jersey court has summarized the common law requirements for accord and
satisfaction as follows:
When a claim is unliquidated and a check is tendered in full settle-
ment, giving the creditor notice of this condition, the creditor's reten-
tion and use of the check constitutes an accord and satisfaction ....
[T]he creditor is deemed to have accepted this condition by depositing
the check for collection notwithstanding any obligation or alteration.
Chancellor, Inc., 418 A.2d at 1327.
56. See Winston, supra note 4, at 192.
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ITl. LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTS AFFECING THE COMMON LAW
DocniT
While the common law approach to settlements of claims is un-
certain as to exactly when accord and satisfaction checks will be
binding on the recipient, the uncertainty is magnified in California
because of competing inconsistent statutes: Civil Code section 1526
and revised Commercial Code sections 1207 and 3311. This section
provides a general background of these statutes and illustrates their
impact on the common law.
A. The Uniform Commercial Code Pre-1990
The Uniform Commercial Code contains several sections that
deal with the topic of settlement of claims.5 7 Under the pre-1990
version of the Code, one of the relevant sections was section 1-207.
The original version of Uniform Commercial Code section 1-207
stated: "A party who with explicit reservation of rights performs or
promises performance or assents to performance in a manner de-
manded or offered by the other party does not thereby prejudice the
rights reserved. Such words as 'without prejudice,' 'under protest,'
or the like are sufficient."58 Both courts and legal commentators
struggled over whether section 1-207 applied to accord and satisfac-
tion checks.59 In other words, the question arose as to whether
57. Before the revisions to Articles 1, 3, and 4 in 1990, the relevant sections
were 1-107, 1-207, 2-209, and 3-605. The Uniform Commercial Code was
first adopted in California in 1963. See CAL. COM. CODE §§ 1101-9508 (West
1964 & Supp. 1990).
58. U.C.C. § 1-207 (1950 Official Text).
59. Although there was a split in authority as to whether § 1-207 applied to
accord and satisfaction checks, most courts and legal commentators held that it
did not apply. See, e.g., Brown v. Coastal Truckways, Inc., 261 S.E.2d 266
(N.C. Ct App. 1980); State Dep't of Fisheries v. J-Z Sales Corp., 610 P.2d 390
(Wash. Ct App. 1980); Jahn v. Burns, 593 P.2d 828 (Wyo. 1979); see also
Wilfredo Caraballo, The Tender Trap: UCC § 1-207 and Its Applicability to an
Attempted Accord and Satisfaction by Tendering a Check in a Dispute Arising
from a Sale of Goods, 11 SETON HALL L. REV. 445, 453-58 (1981) (explaining
the different interpretations and applications of § 1-207); Albert . Rosenthal,
Discord and Dissatisfaction: Section 1-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code,
78 COLUM. L. REv. 48, 58-64 (1978) (discussing the legislative history of § 1-
207). A significant jurisdiction holding that § 1-207 altered the law of accord
and satisfaction is New York See Horn Waterproofing Corp. v. Bushwick
Iron & Steel Co., 488 N.E.2d 56, 61 (N.Y. 1985).
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section 1-207 altered the common law doctrine of accord and satis-
faction which states that acceptance of a conditional check for pay-
ment of a disputed claim bars an action for recovery on the balance
due.
60
In Scholl v. Tallman,61 South Dakota became the first jurisdic-
tion whose highest court addressed the issue of whether section 1-
207 circumvents the common law doctrine of accord and satisfac-
tion.62 In Scholl, Wesley Scholl, a carpenter, performed services for
Clinton and Virginia Tallman. 63 A good faith dispute arose as to the
amount the Tallmans owed Scholl." They sent a check for $500 to
Scholl with the words, "Wesley Scholl Settlement in Full for all La-
bor and Materials to Date" typed on the back of the check. 65 Scholl
scratched out that language and added the following language before
cashing the check: "Restriction of payment in full refused., 66 Scholl
then made a claim for the alleged balance due.67 The South Dakota
Supreme Court held that Scholl effectively reserved his rights under
section 1-207.68 Thus, the Scholl court held that section 1-207 does
apply to accord and satisfaction checks and therefore nullified the
common law doctrine of accord and satisfaction in that jurisdiction.
In Cass Construction Co. v. Brennan,69 however, the Nebraska
Supreme Court held that section 1-207 does not alter the common
law doctrine of accord and satisfaction. 70 Cass Construction Com-
pany ("Creditor") entered into an oral agreement with Tim Brennan
and Jim Asmussen ("Debtor") whereby Creditor agreed to do some
dirt moving work on Debtor's property.71 A dispute arose as to the
60. See supra Part II; see also White, supra note 5, at 515.
61. 247 N.W.2d 490 (S.D. 1976).
62. See White, supra note 5, at 515.
63. See Scholl, 247 N.W.2d at 490.
64. See id.
65. Id. at 491.
66. Id.
67. See id.
68. See id. at 492. The holding was made based on South Dakota Codified
Law section 57-1-23, which is South Dakota's version of UCC § 1-207. See
id.
69. 382 N.W.2d 313 (Neb. 1986).
70. See id. at 320.
71. See id. at 315.
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amount due.72 Debtor sent a check to Creditor for $1408.25 which
was accompanied by a letter, which expressed dissatisfaction with
the Creditor's work and also stated that the $1408.25 was in "final
settlement of the bill., 73 Creditor accepted the $1408.25 as partial
payment on the debt but sent a letter to Debtor claiming that Debtor
still owed $16,716.75. 74  Creditor then deposited the check.
Creditor sued for the remaining balance after Debtor made no further
payments.
76
Debtor invoked the doctrine of accord and satisfaction as an af-
firmative defense claiming that Creditor compromised any right it
may have had to pursue the additional amount once it cashed the
$1408.25 check.77 The Antelope County District Court concluded
that since Creditor accepted the check, its acceptance was subject to
the conditional language, and therefore the payment was in full satis-
faction of the claim 78 In addition, the district court held that section
1-207 did not alter or abolish the common law doctrine of accord and
satisfaction.79
The Nebraska Supreme Court agreed.80 Creditor argued that
section 1-207 alters the common law because it allows a creditor to
cash conditional checks while retaining the right to sue for any un-
paid balance. 81 Creditor based its argument on the plain words of
section 1-207 as well as on the policy of encouraging the free flow of
commerce.12 The supreme court rejected Creditor's arguments and
held that "the language 83 of section 1-207 and its history,84 purpose,
72. See id. at 315-16.
73. Id. at316.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. See id. at 317.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. Comments 1 and 2 of § 1-207 suggest that § 1-207 was not designed to
alter the law of accord and satisfaction with regard to "payment in full" checks.
Rather, the intent of § 1-207 was to allow contracting parties to proceed with
performance without risking the possibility of waiving their rights. In other
words, "the provision was designed to deal with problems of waiver, election
of remedies, and estoppel rather than with attempted accord and satisfaction."
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and policy8" do not alter the common law principles of accord and
satisfaction.
',86
California authority sided with those courts holding that pre-
revision section 1-207 did not alter the common law rules governing
accord and satisfaction. In Connecticut Printers, Inc. v. Gus Kroe-
sen, Inc., 7 the court of appeal noted that section 1-207 was enacted
to deal with reservation of rights for performance under one contract,
while in an accord and satisfaction, a second contract is created
through offer, acceptance, and consideration. 88 Thus in California,
pre-revision section 1-207 did not permit a creditor to strike payment
in full language and pursue the debtor for the balance of the claim.
Id. at 318 (quoting Julian B. McDonnell, Purposive Interpretation of the Uni-
form Commercial Code: Some Implications for Jurisprudence, 126 U. PA. L.
REv. 795, 828 (1978)). Further, according to the language of§ 1-207, it seems
to be limited to those transactions in which the parties intend performance
along the lines of the original contract An accord and satisfaction, however,
involves a new contract See Cass Constr. Co., 382 N.W.2d at 318.
84. The history of § 1-207 arguably indicates that it was not intended to ap-
ply to accord and satisfaction checks. Section 1-207 of the 1950 proposed fi-
nal draft of the UCC coexisted with UCC § 3-802(3)(Official Draft 1952).
Section 3-802(3) expanded the common law by permitting undisputed and liq-
uidated claims to be subject to accord and satisfaction checks. Section 3-
802(3) was deleted from the 1957 official draft due to concerns of abuse.
Thus, accord and satisfaction continued to remain a common law doctrine.
Commentators argued that § 1-207 does not deal with the issue of accord and
satisfaction because § 3-802(3), which did address accord and satisfaction,
made no reference to § 1-207. This suggests that the drafters did not intend to
write overlapping sections regarding accord and satisfaction. Therefore § 3-
802(3), which was subsequently deleted, was the section which dealt with the
issue of accord and satisfaction, whereas § 1-207 did not See Cass Constr.
Co., 382 N.W.2d at 319. For a detailed discussion of the legislative history
behind § 1-207, see Rosenthal, supra note 59, at 58-65.
85. The purpose and policies behind §§ 1-207 and 3-311 will be examined
infra Part IV.
86. Cass Constr. Co., 382N.W.2dat317.
87. 134 Cal. App. 3d 54, 184 Cal. Rptr. 436 (1982).
88. See id. at 60, 184 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 439 (citing State Dept. of Fisheries v.
J-Z Sales Corp., 610 P.2d 390 (Wash. 1980)).
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B. The Civil Code
1. Section 1526
In 1987, the California legislature enacted Civil Code section
1526.89 Section 1526 repudiates the common law of accord and sat-
isfaction. 90 When the California legislature enacted section 1526, it
essentially placed California in the camp of states permitting credi-
tors to protest payment in fall language.91 Section 1526 changes
California common law by generally allowing a creditor to accept the
debtor's check and sue for the balance if it strikes out the payment in
full language or if the acceptance of the check was inadvertent or
without notice of the notation.92
89. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 1526 (West Supp. 1999). The statute became
effective on January 1, 1988. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 9600 (West 1980 &
Supp. 1999).
90. See Burnham, supra note 8, at 485.
91. See supra notes 59-68 and accompanying text
92. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1526. Specifically, section 1526, entitled
"Check or draft tendered in full discharge of claim; acceptance; protest; com-
position or extension agreement between debtor and creditors; release of
claim," provides:
(a)Where a claim is disputed or unliquidated and a check or draft is
tendered by the debtor in settlement thereof in full discharge of the
claim, and the words "payment in full" or other words of similar
meaning are notated on the check or draft; the acceptance of the check
or draft does not constitute an accord and satisfaction if the creditor
protests against accepting the tender in full payment by striking out or
otherwise deleting that notation or if the acceptance of the check or
draft was inadvertent or without knowledge of the notation.
(b) Notwithstanding subdivision (a), the acceptance of a check or draft
constitutes an accord and satisfaction if a check or draft is tendered
pursuant to a composition or extension agreement between a debtor
and its creditors, and pursuant to that composition or extension agree-
ment, all creditors of the same class are accorded similar treatment,
and the creditor receives the check or draft with knowledge of the re-
striction. A creditor shall be conclusively presumed to have knowl-
edge of the restriction if a creditor either: (1) Has, previous to the re-
ceipt of the check or draft, executed a written consent to the
composition or extension agreement (2) Has been given, not less than
15 days nor more than 90 days prior to the receipt of the check or
draft, notice, in writing, that a check or draft will be tendered with a
restrictive endorsement and that acceptance and cashing of the check
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2. Interpreting section 1526
Subsection (a) follows the common law doctrine of accord and
satisfaction in that it restricts application of the statute to instances
"[w]here a claim is disputed or unliquidated. ' 93 In subsection (a),
"claim" should arguably be construed broadly, describing a right to
payment generally, whether or not reduced to judgment.94 This in-
terpretation would be in line with the common law where any dis-
pute, such as a tort claim, a debt, or an implied contract fell within
the boundaries of accord and satisfaction.95
Subsection (a) also requires the check or draft to contain the
language "'payment in full' or other words of similar meaning."96 It
is unclear whether the legislature intended the statute to apply when-
ever a conditional check or draft is offered, or only when the pay-
ment in full language appears on the actual check or draft.97 "A lit-
eral interpretation might hold that the statute does not apply in cases
where an oral statement, separate communication, or accompanying
letter, rather than the check itself communicates the offer to the
creditor."98 Professor Burnham argues that it is nonsensical to apply
section 1526 only when the payment in full language appears on the
check, and refuse to apply section 1526 when the language appears
on an accompanying document. 99 This argument is supported by
or draft will constitute an accord and satisfaction.
(c) Notwithstanding subdivision (a), the acceptance of a check or draft
by a creditor constitutes an accord and satisfaction when the check or
draft is issued pursuant to or in conjunction with a release of a claim.
(d) For the purposes of paragraph (2) of subdivision (b), mailing the
notice by first class mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the address
shown for the creditor on the debtor's books or such other address as
the creditor may designate in writing constitutes notice.
Id. (emphasis added).
93. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1526(a).
94. See Burnham, supra note 8, at 486.
95. See id.
96. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1526(a).
97. See Burnham, supra note 8, at 486-87.
98. Id. at487.
99. See id. On the other hand, if section 1526 were applicable to only those
instances in which the debtor wrote the payment in full language on the check,
then the statute would serve the communication function by encouraging debt-
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California case law where courts have consistently allowed an offer
to enter into an accord to be stated on the check itself or in a separate
communication.10
The final portion of subsection (a) marks the greatest deviation
from the common law doctrine of accord and satisfaction. Under the
common law, a creditor receiving a payment in fall check had two
options: (1) accept the accord according to its terms (thus dismissing
the balance of the claim), or (2) reject the accord and preserve the
right to sue for the balance.' 0' However, under subsection (a) of
section 1526, the creditor may reject the offer to enter into an accord
but still accept the conditional check and apply it towards the balance
of the account. 10 2 In other words, the creditor may "have its cake
and eat it too." Subsection (a) lists three ways in which the creditor
may do this: (1) strike out or otherwise delete the payment in fall
language, (2) inadvertently accept the check, or (3) accept the check
without knowledge of the payment in full language.
10 3
Subsection (b) carves out an exception to the requirements under
subsection (a). Under subsection (b), the acceptance of a check or
draft qualifies as an accord and satisfaction if the check is tendered
pursuant to a composition or extension agreement and the following
two conditions are met: (1) all creditors of the same class are treated
similarly, and (2) the creditor receives the check with knowledge of
the restriction.' 0 4 Professor Burnham questions how this provision
ties in with the rest of section 1526: "The provision seems out of
place in the statute, however, for the statute is concerned with dis-
puted or unliquidated debts, while a composition agreement gener-
ally involves acknowledged obligations that the debtor is unable to
pay. 10
5
ors to clearly communicate the offer to enter into the accord. See id.
100. See, e.g., Berger v. Lane, 190 Cal. 443, 452, 213 P. 45, 49 (1923) (An
offer to enter into an accord "sometimes is shown by the express words used in
the body of the check or by an accompanying receipt stating that the amount
sent is in full of all demands.") (emphasis added).
101. See supra Part II.
102. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1526(a).
103. See id.
104. See id. § 1526(b).
105. Burnham, supra note 8, at488-89.
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Subsection (b) contains an additional ambiguity. Professor
Burnham points out that subsection (b) applies when the creditor
receives the check with "'knowledge of the restriction.' 0° How-
ever, in subsection (a), "'knowledge of the notation"' is the phrase
that is used.10 7 What was the legislature's intent in using the term
"restriction" in subsection (b) and then using the term "notation" in
subsection (a)? It is likely that the legislature intended the phrases to
mean the same thing-knowledge that the check is offered to dis-
charge the obligation. 0 8 However, this again illustrates the sloppy
and ambiguous drafting of section 1526. Professor Burnham points
out yet another ambiguity arising from the phrase "knowledge of the
restriction" in subsection (b).'09  Subsection (b) defines knowl-
edge." 0 This raises the question of whether this definition also ap-
plies to the word "knowledge" in subsection (a)."'
In Armco Inc. v. Glenfed Financial Corp.,"2 the court shed
some light on this issue. The court was faced with determining
whether defendant Glenfed clearly communicated to plaintiff Armco
that the check was offered as an accord and satisfaction." 3 The de-
fendant sent the plaintiff a letter in which it calculated its obligation
and enclosed a check for that amount. 14 The plaintiff argued that an
accord and satisfaction cannot be reached unless the tendering party
notifies the offeree in "'express terms"' or by an "explicit state-
ment."115
106. Id. at 489 (quoting CAL. Cry. CODE § 1526(b)) (emphasis added by Pro-
fessor Burnham).
107. Id. (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 1526(b)) (emphasis added by Professor
Burnham).
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1526(b).
111. See id. § 1526(a).
112. 720 F. Supp. 1129 (D.N.J. 1989).
113. See id. at 1154.
114. See id. The letter stated: "Pursuant to Section 2 of the Aircraft Agree-
ment dated as of April 10, 1985, this is to advise you that we have received
$17,379,463.00 in Insurance Proceeds from National Union, calculated as fol-
lows .... " Id. "This is the amount agreed to with Scott Beeken in Dallas on
July 29, 1985, when he was reviewing the Residual Value Policy offer. If you
need any additional information, please call me or any of the people here who
have been handling the matter." Id. at 1154 n.48.
115. Id. at 1154-55.
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In resolving this issue, the court first looked to the common law.
The plaintiff relied on Potter v. Pacific Coast Lumber Co.," 6 where
the California Supreme Court held that the debtor must expressly
make clear that the check is intended as full satisfaction of the
claimi17 The Potter court emphasized that the notice requirement is
not met where the debtor simply includes with the check an account
showing the balance equal to the amount of the check."
8
The court then continued its examination of the notice require-
ment by looking at section 1526 by analogy." 9 The court construed
the statute by combining subsections (a) and (b). 120 Subsection (a)
states:
Where a claim is disputed or unliquidated and a check or
draft is tendered by the debtor in settlement thereof in full
discharge of the claim, and the words 'payment in full' or
other words of similar meaning are notated on the check or
draft, the acceptance of the check or draft does not consti-
tute an accord and satisfaction if ... the acceptance of the
check or draft was.., without knowledge of the notation.
121
Subsection (b) states in part:
A creditor shall be conclusively presumed to have knowl-
edge by the restriction if a creditor either: (1) Has, previous
to the receipt of the check or draft, executed a written con-
sent to the composition or extension agreement[, or] (2)
[h]as been given, not less than 15 days nor more than 90
days prior to receipt of the check or draft, notice, in writing,
that a check or draft will be tendered with a restrictive en-
dorsement and that acceptance and cashing of the check or
draft will constitute an accord and satisfaction.'
22
116. 37 Cal. 2d592, 234 P.2d 16 (1951).
117. See Armco, 720 F. Supp. at 1155 (citing Potter, 37 Cal. 2d at 597, 234
P.2d at 19).
118. See Potter, 37 Cal. 2d at 607-08, 234 P.2d at 25 (citing Work v. Associ-
ated Almond Growers, 102 Cal. App. 232, 236, 282 P. 965 (1929)).
119. SeeArmco, 720 F. Supp. at 1155. The Armco court considered Califor-
nia Civil Code section 1526 only by analogy because section 1526 was not in
existence at the time the aircraft agreement was signed. See id.
120. See id.
121. Id. (quoting CAL. Cry. CODE § 1526 (emphasis added)).
122. Id. (quoting CAL. CIy. CODE § 1526).
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Thus, the court focused on the term "knowledge" in subsection
(a) and the language of the statute which stated that a creditor shall
be conclusively presumed to have knowledge of the accord if the
creditor falls within either section 1526(b)(1) or (b)(2).123 Because
the defendant failed to provide adequate notice to the plaintiff under
both the common law and section 1526 by analogy, the defendant's
motion for summary judgment based on the doctrine of accord and
satisfaction was denied.'24
Subsection (c) of section 1526 states that the acceptance of a
check or draft by a creditor constitutes an accord and satisfaction
when the check or draft is issued with a release of a claim. 125 Thus,
subsection (c) provides an exception to subsection (a). Subsection
(a) applies to claims that are disputed or unliquidated and provides
ways to render the accord ineffective.' 26 Subsection (c), however,
allows checks issued with a release of a claim to constitute an effec-
tive accord and satisfaction. 127 Arguably subsection (c) completely
vitiates subsection (a). 28 In other words, if the word 'claim' has the
same meaning in subsection (a) and subsection (c), then subsection
(c) would totally trump subsection (a).
In Red Alarm, Inc. v. Waycrosse, Inc.,29 the Ninth Circuit ad-
dressed the issue of how to reconcile section 1526(c) with section
1526(a). 30 The dispute arose fromthe following facts. In 1988, Red
Alarm and Silent Knight negotiated an agreement in which Red
Alarm agreed to purchase security alarm equipment from Silent
Knight.'' In 1990, Red Alarm grew dissatisfied with some of the
equipment it was receiving from Silent Knight. 132  Subsequently,
Red Alarm sent a letter and check to Silent Knight's "lock box."'133
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. See CAL. Cry. CODE § 1526(c).
126. See id. § 1526(a).
127. See id.
128. See Burnham, supra note 8, at 492-93.
129. 47 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 1995).
130. See id. at 1002-04.
131. See id. at 1001.
132. See id.
133. See id. "The 'lock box' is an automatic check depository wherein
checks sent to Silent Knight by its customers are automatically deposited into
its account by its bank" Id. at 1001 n.2.
[Vol. 33:1
SATISFA CTION NOT GUARANTEED
The letter attempted to waive certain warranty claims and create ad-
ditional contractual terms between the parties. 34 The letter further
stated that acceptance of the check constituted Silent Knight's
agreement to all the terms outlined in the letter.'35 The following
notation appeared on the back of the check: "We agree to Red
Alarm, Inc.'s proposed settlement offer dated February 21, 1992.2,136
Because the check and letter "[w]ere sent to the lock box, the check
was automatically deposited and the letter was forwarded to Silent
Knight's offices."
13 7
Upon receipt of the letter, Silent Knight "promptly notified Red
Alarm that it rejected the terms of the letter and that it was retaining
the check as payment for a past due invoice."'138 Red Alarm claimed
that Silent Knight was now bound by the terms of the settlement let-
ter because it had cashed and retained the check.' 39 When Red
Alarm informed Silent Knight that it refused to abide by the original
terms of the contract, Silent Knight terminated the contract. 40 Red
Alarm filed suit alleging that the settlement letter and accompanying
check constituted an accord and satisfaction.'
4'
The Ninth Circuit determined that a bona fide dispute existed. 142
However, the court found that under section 1526(a), the acceptance
of the check did not constitute an accord and satisfaction because
Silent Knight accepted the check "inadvertent[ly]" and "without
knowledge of the notation. ' 143 Red Alarm argued that although the
act of cashing the check likely did not constitute acceptance of the
accord, Silent Knight accepted the accord when it retained the check
after becoming aware of the letter's terms.' 44 The court refuted this
argument by stating "[C]ivil Code section 1526(a) ... changes Cali-
fornia common law and allows a creditor to accept the debtor's
134. See id. at 1001.
135. See id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. See id. at 1002.
142. See id.
143. Id. at 1003.
144. See id.
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check if it strikes out the 'payment in full' language or if the accep-
tance of the check was inadvertent or without notice of the notation,
both of which it was.',
145
Red Alarm then argued for an accord and satisfaction under
section 1526(c).146 Red Alarm argued that because its letter offered
to waive its warranty claims, it constituted a "'[r]elease of a claim'
within the meaning of section 1526(C).,' 147 Therefore, Red Alarm
argued that Silent Knight's acceptance of the check effectuated an
accord and satisfaction. 1
48
The court acknowledged that a literal reading of section 1526(c)
seemed to support Red Alarm's argument. 149 The court, however,
emphasized that section 1526(c) must not be read as expansively as
the language suggests.' 50 Every proposed accord and satisfaction es-
sentially involves a release of the compromised claim.' 51 "If section
1526(c) is interpreted that broadly, then it will completely vitiate
section 1526(a).' 52 The court concluded that section 1526(c) must
be read while keeping the entire statute in mind. 53 The court limited
the applicability of section 1526(c) to those situations in which the
parties negotiate a formal release of the claim and should therefore
be able to rely on the acceptance of the check as an effectuation of
the release. 154
In summary, while section 1526 is somewhat ambiguous, it ap-
pears that any debtor who attempts to use a payment in full check, in
other than a formal release or composition situation, does so at the
debtor's peril. As Professor Burnham points out, section 1526 is a
"trap for the unwary."'155 A debtor may unwittingly try to use a pay-
ment in full check to informally resolve a claim only to find that the
145. Id.
146. See id. at 1003-04.
147. Id. at 1003.
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. Id.
153. See id.
154. See id. at 1003-04.
155. Burnham, supra note 8, at 493.
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creditor has crossed out the restrictive language. The debtor may
then be hauled into court to defend the balance of the claim.
C. Revised Uniform Commercial Code Sections 1-207 and 3-311
As indicated above, there was a significant split in authority as
to whether pre-revision section 1-207 applied to accord and satisfac-
tion checks. 156 As part of the overall revision of Articles 3 and 4 of
the Uniform Commercial Code, the drafters tried to resolve this split
of authority with revised sections 1-207 and 3-311.
1. Revised section 1-207
In 1990, the drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code revised
Articles 3 and 4 together with conforming amendments to Article
1.157 In 1992, the California legislature adopted these revisions in
Commercial Code Divisions 1, 3, and 4. The revised divisions of the
California Commercial Code took effect January 1, 1993.18
Revised section 1-207(2) explicitly states that section 1-207(1)
does not apply to an accord and satisfaction. 5 9 Official comment 3
states that section 1-207 was revised in response to the split in judi-
cial authority regarding the application of section 1-207 to an accord
and satisfaction. 60 In addition, official comment 3 also states that
revised section 3-311 now governs those transactions in which an ac-
cord and satisfaction is attempted through the use of a check.'
6 1
Thus, in California, section 3311 is now the relevant Commer-
cial Code section when dealing with an accord and satisfaction
check.' 62 The Commercial Code section is the same as Uniform
Commercial Code section 3-311.
156. See supra notes 59-88 and accompanying text
157. See U.C.C. arts. 1, 3, 4 (1990 Official Text).
158. See CAL. COM. CODE § 16,101 (West 1990 & Supp. 1999).
159. See U.C.C. § 1-207 (1990 Official Text). Subsection (2) did not exist in
former § 1-207. See id.
160. See id. § 1-207 cmt. 3.
161. See id.
162. Note that as discussed infra Part V, although it is clear that section 3311
is the relevant Commercial Code statute on the issue of accord and satisfaction,
it is still not clear as to which statute, Commercial Code section 3311 or Civil
Code section 1526, governs the law of accord and satisfaction in California or
whether both statutes are somehow applicable.
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2. Revised UCC section 3-311
Revised Uniform Commercial Code section 3-311 states that a
conspicuously designated payment in full check is effective to dis-
charge a claim if(1) it is tendered in good faith, (2) the amount of the
claim was unliquidated or subject to a bona fide dispute, and (3) the
recipient obtains payment of the check.163 The statute also contains
some exceptions which protect recipients of such checks from inad-
vertently negotiating them and thus mistakenly releasing a claim.
164
163. See CAL. CoM. CODE § 3311(a). Specifically, section 3311, titled
"Disputed obligation; Good faith tender of instrument" provides:
(a) If a person against whom a claim is asserted proves that (1) that
person in good faith tendered an instrument to the claimant as full
satisfaction of the claim, (2) the amount of the claim was unliquidated
or subject to a bona fide dispute, and (3) the claimant obtained pay-
ment of the instrument the following subdivisions apply.
(b) Unless subdivision (c) applies, the claim is discharged if the per-
son against whom the claim is asserted proves that the instrument
or an accompanying written communication contained a con-
spicuous statement to the effect that the instrument was tendered
as full satisfaction of the claim.
(c) Subject to subdivision (d), a claim is not discharged under subdivi-
sion (b) if either of the following applies:
(1) the claimant if an organization, proves that (A) within a rea-
sonable time before the tender, the claimant sent a conspicuous
statement to the person against whom the claim is asserted that
communications concerning disputed debts, including an instru-
ment tendered as ful satisfaction of a debt are to be sent to a
designated person, office, or place, and (B) the instrument or ac-
companying communication was not received by that designated
person, office or place.
(2) The claimant whether or not an organization, proves that
within 90 days after payment of the instrument the claimant ten-
dered repayment of the amount of the instrument to the person
against whom the claim is asserted ....
(d) A claim is discharged if the person against whom the claim is as-
serted proves that within a reasonable time before collection of the in-
strument was initiated, the claimant... knew that the instrument was
tendered in full satisfaction of the claim.
Id. § 3311.
164. See id. § 3311(c).
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a. interpreting 3-311
Official comments 1 and 2 explain that the drafters' intent be-
hind section 3-311 was essentially to codify the common law doc-
trine of accord and satisfaction while adding some minor changes to
reflect modem business conditions. 165  The common law provides
that the recipient of the payment in full check has the choice of either
(1) accepting the check and thus releasing the claim, or (2) refusing
the check and preserving the claim 166 Under this rule, the recipient
of the check does not have the option of protesting the payment in
full language while taking the check. 167 Official comment 3 states
that section 3-311 is premised on the belief that the common law rule
produces a fair result, and payment in full checks encourage informal
dispute resolution.
168
Sections 3-311(a) and (b) codify the common law doctrine of
accord and satisfaction. Section 3-311(b), like the common law, re-
quires the debtor to prove that the instrument 69 contained a "con-
spicuous statement"'170 making it clear that the check was tendered as
full satisfaction of the claim. 171 Section 3-311(a) codifies the other
three requirements for an accord and satisfaction under the common
law: (1) the debtor must act in good faith 172 while tendering the
165. See U.C.C. § 3-311 cmts. 1 &2.
166. See supra PartII.
167. See supra Part II.
168. See U.C.C. § 3-311 cmt. 3.
169. It is not limited to just the instrument itself. The conspicuous statement
can be on an accompanying document, but it must still be in writing. See CAL.
COM. CODE § 3311(b).
170. Id. § 3311 cmt. 4. A statement is conspicuous if "'it is so written that a
reasonable person against whom it is to operate ought to have noticed it.'
U.C.C. § 1-201(10) quoted in CAL. COM. CODE § 3311 cmt. 4. If the claimant
can reasonably be expected to examine the check, almost any language on the
check should be noticed and therefore will be considered conspicuous. See id.
171. See U.C.C. § 3-311(b).
172. Section 1-201(19) of the UCC defines good faith as honesty in fact
This section, however, does not apply to Article 3 of the UCC. A good faith
dispute is defined differently for the purposes of Articles 3 and 4. Section 3-
103(a)(4) defines good faith as not only honesty in fact, but also requires the
observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing. See id. § 3-311
cmt. 4 (citing U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(4) (1990)). Thus, good faith under Article 3
has both a subjective and an objective component An example given in the
official commentary on bad faith is when a debtor routinely writes "payment in
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check in full satisfaction of the claim; (2) the amount of the claim
must be unliquidated or subject to a bona fide dispute; and (3) the
creditor must obtain payment of the check.1
73
While subsections (a) and (b) of section 3-311 codify the ele-
ments of the common law doctrine of accord and satisfaction, sub-
section (c) provides limitations on the applicability of an accord and
satisfaction check. 174  Subsection (c)(1) deals with an accord and
satisfaction check when the creditor is an organization. 175 This sub-
section states that a payment in full check does not discharge a claim
if the creditor proves that: (1) it is an organization, 176 (2) the organi-
zation has communicated to the other party that an offer of full pay-
ment is to be sent to a particular person, office, or place, and (3) the
check was not received by the designated person, office, or place.'
77
It is designed to protect the creditor against inadvertent accord and
satisfactions. 178 Comment 5 states that this section is aimed specifi-
cally at protecting organizations, because when the creditor is an or-
ganization, there is a greater likelihood that the check may be depos-
ited without notice to those in the organization who are concerned
with the disputed claim. 1
79
For example, business organizations such as department stores
and public utilities generally have claims against a large number of
customers.'80 Customers normally send their checks to a central lo-
cation where the organization's clerks process the checks and simply
record that payment has been made. 18' An inadvertent accord and
satisfaction can occur when a clerk who is trained to simply process
the check and note the account number fails to notice the payment in
full" as the debtor's regular business practice, preventing an accord and satis-
faction on the ground that such checks are not tendered in good faith. See id.
173. See id. § 3-311(a).
174. See id. § 3-311(c).
175. See id.§3-311(c)(1).
176. Organization includes a corporation, government, government subdivi-
sion or agency, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, association, two or
more persons having a joint or common venture, or any other legal or commer-
cial entity. See id. §1-201(28) quoted in Winston, supra note 4, at 219 n.289.
177. See CAL. COM. CODE § 3311(c)(1).
178. See id. § 3311 cmt. 5.
179. See id.
180. See id.
181. See id.
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full language on a check. 182 Subsection (c)(1) allows an organization
to protect itself from this problem by advising customers that com-
munications regarding disputed debts must be sent to a particular
person, office, or place. 183 If the organization complies with the re-
quirements of section 3-311(c)(1), the check is treated as a partial
payment of the debt, and not as an offer to settle.184 Thus, "this sec-
tion prevents a clever or careless debtor, aware of these modem
business practices, from 'pulling a fast one' by slipping a full settle-
ment check through the system to pay less than the full amount on an
allegedly questionably disputed claim""'8 5
Section 3-311(c)(2) is also designed to prevent inadvertent ac-
cord and satisfaction. 186 If the creditor discovers that it has received
a payment in full check, it can prevent an accord and satisfaction if
the creditor tenders repayment of the check to the debtor within
ninety days after the debtor tendered the check. 187 In other words,
subsection (c)(2) provides a ninety-day window to rectify an inad-
vertent acceptance of a payment in full check. Section 3-311(c)(2)
can be used by any creditor, whether or not an organization.188
Subsections (c)(1) and (c)(2), however, are subject to section 3-
311(d). 189 Subsection (d) states that if the debtor proves that the
creditor knew' 90 the check was tendered as a payment in full check,
182. See id.
183. See id. § 3-311(c)(1).
184. See Winston, supra note 4, at 219; see also CAL. COM. CODE § 3311
cmt. 5 (illustrating the application of subsection (c)(1) as a limitation on sub-
section (b) in cases in which claimant is an organization).
185. Winston, supra note 4, at 220.
186. See U.C.C. § 3-3 11 cmt. 6.
187. See id.
188. A creditor who is an organization can only use § 3-311(c)(2) as an al-
ternative to § 3-311(c)(1). It cannot use both. See id. § 3-311 cmt. 6.
189. See id. § 3-311(d).
190. A claimant knows that a check was tendered in full satisfaction of a
claim when the creditor "has actual knowledge" of the fact. U.C.C. § 1-
201(25). If the claimant is an organization, it has knowledge that a check was
tendered in full satisfaction of the claim when that fact is
brought to the attention of the individual conducting that transaction,
and in any event from the time when it would have been brought to his
attention if the organization had exercised due diligence. An organi-
zation exercises due diligence if it maintains reasonable routines for
communicating significant information to the person conducting the
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then the claim is discharged even if (1) the check was not sent to the
person, office, or place required by a notice from the creditor in
compliance with subsection (c)(1); or (2) the claimant tendered re-
payment of the amount of the check in compliance with subsection(c)(2).1 91
In summary, UCC section 3-311 essentially codifies the com-
mon law doctrine of accord and satisfaction. Under section 3-311, a
creditor, upon receiving a payment in full check, has the option of
either: (1) accepting the check and thus releasing the balance of the
claim, or (2) returning the check and preserving the right to seek the
full amount. Section 3-311(c) addresses the issue of inadvertent ac-
cord and satisfaction in the commercial context and implements
safeguards to protect the creditor.
b. criticisms of 3-311
The revision to section 1-207 and the creation of section 3-311
have facilitated the settlement of claims via accord and satisfaction
checks, but there is an argument that the revisions do not go far
enough. The requirement of a bona fide or unliquidated claim goes
beyond other Uniform Commercial Code sections dealing with set-
tlement of claims, and the provisions dealing with inadvertent ac-
ceptance of payment in full checks arguably provide greater protec-
tions to creditors than necessary.
As noted above, there are several sections in the Uniform Com-
mercial Code that deal with settlements. Section 1-107 permits the
discharge of any claim or right arising out of a breach by a written
release signed by the aggrieved party. Sections 2-209 and 2A-208,
dealing with sales and leases of goods respectively, permit a modifi-
cation of a contract without consideration. Section 3-604 permits a
party entitled to enforce a negotiable instrument to discharge the ob-
ligation of a party to pay the instrument, also without considera-
tion.'
92
transaction and there is reasonable compliance with the routines.
U.C.C. § 1-201(27).
191. See CAL. COM. CODE § 3311(d).
192. The discharge can occur through voluntary destruction of the instru-
ment, striking a signature, or otherwise by agreement not to sue. See U.C.C. §
3-604(a).
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The only requirement for discharge under these other UCC sec-
tions is the overarching requirement of good faith found in various
sections of the UCC.193 There is no express requirement that the set-
tled claim be in honest dispute or that the claim be unliquidated. 1
94
It may be that in most cases, if there is no dispute, the debtor
will also be acting in bad faith in attempting to obtain a release via a
payment in full check. But in some cases, because of financial hard-
ship on the part of the debtor, and the creditor's desire to receive
something, there might be a legitimate commercial reason for the
parties to settle even if the amount owed is not in dispute. A verbal
modification of a sale of goods contract to reduce the price for a fi-
nancially distressed buyer might be enforceable under section 2-209,
while the buyer's attempt to settle via a payment in full check would
not be enforceable under section 3-311. The requirement of a bona
fide dispute or unliquidated claim also requires litigation over the
merits of the dispute. It is not clear why the standards for settlement
under section 3-311 are higher than the standards under other UCC
provisions.
As noted above, section 3-311 has safeguards to protect against
"clever debtors" who attempt to slip payment in full checks past un-
suspecting creditors. Section 3-31 1(c)(1) permits creditors to require
such checks to be sent to a specified office. Commentators have
criticized this section because it reduces the rights of debtors to in-
formally settle disputes with organizations. 195 It has been argued that
the problem targeted by section 3-31 l(c)(1) is not supported by em-
pirical data and therefore it may be unnecessary.
196
193. See U.C.C. §§ 1-203, 2-103(1)(b), 3-103(a)(3) (1999 Official Text).
194. Official comment 2 to § 2-209 speaks of the need for a "legitimate
commercial reason" for a modification to be enforceable. See U.C.C. § 2-209
cmt. 2.
195. See Gail K. Hillebrand, Revised Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code: A Consumer Perspective, 42 ALA. L. RV. 679, 691 (1991).
196. See id. Ms. Hillebrand suggests that prior to limiting the applicability
of accord and satisfaction by adopting section 3-311(c)(1), state legislators
should demand proof that full payment checks sent to centralized payment
centers are a genuine problem. Assuming it is a genuine problem, legislators
should then demand proof that creditors cannot solve this problem by simply
instituting better check handling procedures. Ms. Hillebrand asserts that this is
a better alternative than reducing consumer rights to use accord and satisfac-
tion. See id.
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Finally, assuming there is a genuine problem of full payment
checks being sent to centralized payment centers, the language of
section 3-311(c)(1) is currently broader than necessary to accomplish
its goal.
197
The rationale of preventing unintended accord and satisfac-
tion when payments are made to a central payment office
applies only to large entities with a centralized payment de-
partment. Yet subsection 3-311(c)(1) allows any size or-
ganization, including those that do not use a central pay-
ment office, to impose a requirement that full payment
checks be sent to a designated person or office.
19 8
It is also possible that many debtors will not pay very careful
attention to or remember the "conspicuous statement"' 99 sent by a
creditor requiring accord and satisfaction checks to be sent to a
specified office.
It may be that section 3-311 (c)(2) provides sufficient safeguards
to creditors and that subsection (c)(1) should be repealed. At some
point, even a creditor with completely automated check processing
will learn that the debtor is refusing further payment on the basis of a
check tendered in accord and satisfaction. If that point comes within
ninety days after payment of the check, subsection (c)(2) permits the
creditor to tender repayment of the check and to assert the claim in
full.200 Ninety days should be sufficient time for even the most
monolithic creditor to discover a payment in full check which was
erroneously accepted. However, if a compelling case can be made
that it is not enough time, perhaps the time could be extended.
IV. WHICH STATUTE (SHoULD) GovERN?
Unfortunately, when the California legislature made revised
sections 1-207 and 3-311 of the UCC part of the California Commer-
cial Code, the legislature did nothing about Civil Code section 1526.
When the California legislature added the transition provisions via
the passage of SB 1405 in 1994, again they left Civil Code section
197. See id.
198. Id. at 692 (footnote omitted).
199. See U.C.C. § 3-311(b).
200. See U.C.C. § 3-311(c)(2) (1995).
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1526 standing.201 An earlier version of SB 1405 contained an ex-
press repeal of section 1526, but it was removed from the bill after it
encountered opposition from the original sponsor of section 1526,
Senator Quentin Kopp (I-San Francisco). 02 Currently, Civil Code
section 1526 unhappily coexists with Commercial Code sections
1207 and 3311 in the California Codes.
The issue thus becomes, which statute-section 3311 or section
1526--should govern the treatment of accord and satisfaction checks
in California? This section analyzes the rules of statutory construc-
tion, examines public policy arguments, and reviews California case
law in concluding that Commercial Code section 3311 should gov-
ern; therefore, Civil Code section 1526 should be repealed.
A. Rules of Statutory Construction
One can attempt to deal with the question of which statute(s)
should govern by using fundamental rules of statutory interpretation.
One such rule is that where two statutes address the same subject
matter, the more recent enactment prevails over an inconsistent prior
enactment. 203 The most recent enactment is considered the latest ex-
pression of legislative will.204  The California legislature enacted
Civil Code section 1526 in 1987,205 and enacted Revised Commer-
cial Code sections 1207 and 3311 in 1992.206 Therefore, the later
Commercial Code enactment should trump the earlier inconsistent
statute, Civil Code section 1526.207
On the other hand, other fundamental rules of statutory con-
struction arguably suggest that Commercial Code section 3311 does
201. See CAL. COM. CODE §§ 16101-16104 (West Supp. 1999).
202. Professor Hull worked with the California State Bar Uniform Commer-
cial Code Committee and with the California Commission on Uniform State
Laws in drafting the transition provisions, and this is his recollection of the
events.
203. See Stafford v. Los Angeles County Employees' Retirement Bd., 42
Cal. 2d 795, 798, 270 P.2d 12, 14 (1954); Directors Guild of America v. Har-
mony Pictures, Inc., 32 F. Supp. 2d 1184, 1192 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
204. See Stafford, 42 Cal. 2d at 798,270 P.2d at 14.
205. See supra Part Ill.A.1.
206. See supra Parts M.C.2, I.C.3.
207. See Steven 0. Weise, Payment-in-Full Checks, 18 CAL. Bus. L. REP.
218, 219-20 (1997) (discussing In re Van Buren Plaza, LLC, 200 B.R. 384
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996)).
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not trump Civil Code section 1526. One rule states that statutes
should be construed in a manner to make them apply together in
harmony, if that is possible.208 Thus, if there is any way in which
Civil Code section 1526 can be reconciled with Commercial Code
section 3311, then they should coexist as opposed to one statute
trumping the other.2°9
Another rule states that statutes that more specifically address
the issue should prevail over more general statutes. 210 One could ar-
gue that Commercial Code sections 3311 and 1207 do not expressly
state the effect of deleting the payment in full language noted on the
check itself. Commercial Code section 3311 is silent on the issue,
and section 1207 simply states that it does not apply to accord and
satisfactions. Thus, the intent of the drafters must be divined from
the official comments, which are not binding on the courts, but
merely persuasive.
Civil Code section 1526, however, is more specific in its appli-
cation than Commercial Code sections 1207 and 3311. Section
1526(a) specifically addresses the issue of deleting the payment in
full language noted on the check.2  Section 1526(a) states that when
a check tendered by the debtor contains the language "payment in
full" on it, acceptance of the check by the creditor does not constitute
an accord and satisfaction if any of the following occur: (1) the
creditor deletes the payment in full language; (2) the creditor inad-
vertently accepts the check; or (3) the creditor does not realize that
the check contains the payment in full language.212 Therefore, an ar-
gument can be made that Civil Code section 1526 should govern be-
cause it expressly discusses the effect of deleting the payment in full
language on a check, whereas Commercial Code sections 1207 and
3311 are silent on this issue. A court, however, in deciding how to
208. See Stafford, 42 Cal. 2d at 799, 270 P.2d at 14.
209. See infra Part IV.C.2 (discussing Directors Guild of America, 32 F.
Supp. 2d at 1190-92, where the U.S. District Court for the Central District of
California addressed the issue of whether sections 1526 and 3311 can be rec-
onciled).
210. See Stafford, 42 Cal. 2d at 798, 270 P.2d at 14.
211. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 1526(a) (West Supp. 1999); see also supra Part
III.B.
212. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1526(a). Of course, in order for section 1526 to
apply, the claim must be disputed or unliquidated. See id.
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apply Commercial Code section 3311, should consider the intent un-
derlying the statute. The official comments make clear that the
drafters' intent in enacting section 3311 was to overrule Civil Code
section 1526, even if section 1526 is not specifically mentioned by
name and number.213
As illustrated above, rules of statutory construction do not ren-
der a clear answer as to which statute should govern. As Professor
Karl Llewellyn stated: "Statutory interpretation still speaks a diplo-
matic tongue," and this is evidenced by the fact that "there are two
opposing canons [of construction] on almost every point. '214 Thus,
to shed some more light on the issue of which statute should govern,
it is arguably more meaningful to consider the different public policy
arguments supporting Civil Code section 1526 and Commercial
Code section 3311.
213. See CAL. COM. CODE § 3311 (West Supp. 1999). Official comment 2
discusses the common law rule of accord and satisfaction. Under the common
law, the debtor can propose a settlement of the disputed debt by clearly noting
payment-in-full type language on the check. The creditor can refuse the check
or can accept it subject to the condition stated by the debtor, but the seller can-
not accept the check and refuse to be bound by the condition. If the creditor
accepts the conditional check, then the claim is relinquished regardless of
whether the creditor deleted the payment in full language. See id. cn. 2. Of-
ficial comment 3 states that section 3311 follows this common law rule. See
id. crnt. 3; see also supra Part IH. Civil Code section 1526 is in clear conflict
with the common law rule because the section does allow the creditor to delete
the payment in full language, cash the check, and preserve the claim. See CAL.
CIV. CODE § 1526. Thus, because the drafters of Commercial Code section
3311 chose to follow the common law, which directly conflicts with Civil
Code section 1526, their intent must have been to overrule Civil Code section
1526.
214. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and
the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L.
REv. 395, 401 (1950). Following are two of the examples given by Professor
Llewellyn: "A statute cannot go beyond its text" vs. "To effect its purpose a
statute may be implemented beyond its text'; "Where design has been dis-
tinctly stated no place is left for construction" vs. "[c]ourts have the power to
inquire into real--as distinct from ostensible-purpose." Id. at 401-02.
November 1999]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LWREVIEW
B. Public Policy
1. Public policy arguments for section 1526
Civil Code section 1526 was enacted to protect creditors'
rights. 215 Specifically, it was enacted to protect creditors from debt-
ors who issue payment in full checks in bad faith. 16 Creditors were
frustrated with the choice2 17 of either taking the check for some of
the amount due, and possibly waiving the balance of their claim, or
not taking the check and having to go through the expense and hassle
of litigation.18 Certainly one can understand the frustration of a
creditor who receives a check from a deadbeat debtor containing the
accord and satisfaction language, especially when the debtor does not
have a legitimate defense to the creditor's full claim. Some legal
commentators have characterized the use of the payment in full
check as "an exquisite form of commercial torture on the payee."
219
For example, if the payment in full offer is reasonable, it creates an
uncomfortable dilemma for the creditor: "'Shall I risk the loss of the
$9000 ["payment in full" check] for an additional $1000 that the
bloke really owes me?' 220 Civil Code section 1526 addresses these
"inequities" that a payment in full check places on a creditor by al-
lowing the creditor to delete the accord and satisfaction language and
215. See Burke Co. v. Hilton Dev. Co., 802 F. Supp. 434, 439 (N.D. Fla.
1992).
216. See Burnham, supra note 8, at 495 n.89.
217. This choice which left the creditors frustrated existed in the common
law doctrine of accord and satisfaction and was subsequently codified and
continues to exist today under section 3311 of the Commercial Code. See su-
pra Parts II, llI.C.2.a.
218. See Burnham, supra note 8, at 481.
219. JAMES WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 13-21, at 544 (2d ed. 1980). But see
Hendrick, supra note 55, at 432 n.87 (quoting Rosenthal, supra note 59, at 56).
Rosenthal answers the charge of White and Summers. "Assuming, however,
parties of equal bargaining power negotiating in good faith at arm's length, it is
not clear why this torture is any more exquisite than that induced by any set-
tlement offer proposing more than the offeree is sure he would receive but less
than he thinks he deserves." Id.
220. Winston, supra note 4, at 210 (citing Horn Waterproofing Corp. v.
Bushwick Iron & Steel Co., 488 N.E.2d 56, 59 (N.Y. 1985) (quoting WHITE &
SUMMERS, supra note 219, § 13-21, at 544-45)).
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sue for the balance of the claim, without worrying about whether
there was a good faith dispute.22 '
While at first blush Civil Code section 1526 appears to give
creditors valuable rights, in the long run those rights are likely to
become illusory. If debtors become aware of the creditor's right to
strike the payment in full language, they will not tender payment in
full checks. In fact, they may not tender any checks at all. If a well-
advised debtor wants to make a partial payment without fear of the
creditor suing for the balance, the debtor will be advised to require a
formal release of claim to be issued by the creditor at the same time
that the check is issued.222 If the creditor is unwilling to provide
such a formal release, the debtor may be better off waiting for the
creditor to sue and obtain a judgment. For creditors, the expense of
negotiating formal releases and pursuing litigation is likely to exceed
any benefits they may obtain from striking payment in full language
and suing for the balance of a claim, which they may not be able to
recover in any event.
2. Public policy arguments for section 3311223
Unlike Civil Code section 1526, Commercial Code section 3311
does not allow a creditor to "have its cake and eat it too." Section
3311 essentially codifies the common law doctrine of accord and
satisfaction by giving a creditor who receives a payment in full check
the choice of either: (1) cashing the check and thus relinquishing the
balance of the claim; or (2) returning the check to the debtor and pre-
serving the claim. 224 It does not allow a creditor to cash a payment
in full check and come after the debtor for the balance of the claim.
221. See supra Parts IH.A, III.B.1.
222. For other suggestions on how to comply with Civil Code section 1526,
see Burnham, supra note 8, at 494-95. See also Weise, supra note 207, at 219
(suggesting that Civil Code section 1526 does not apply to offers of accord and
satisfaction not "notated" on the check itself).
223. Because Commercial Code section 3311 essentially codifies the com-
mon law doctrine of accord and satisfaction, many of the public policy argu-
ments supporting the common law also apply to section 3311. Thus, argu-
ments that have previously been used to support the common law will be used
in this Article to support section 3311.
224. See supra Part I.B.2.
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The rationale underlying Commercial Code section 3311 is
more sound than the rationale underlying Civil Code section 1526.
The law favors settlements, and Commercial Code section 3311 fur-
thers this goal. 25 Section 3311 facilitates informal, efficient, and
inexpensive dispute resolution, 226 at a time where "[t]he costs and
delays associated with litigation are mounting in geometric progres-
sion. '22 7 These high litigation costs and lengthy delays adversely ef-
fect both large business entities as well as the average American.
For example, as of 1990, American corporations were spending in
excess of $20 billion annually defending lawsuits. 228 In the Judicial
Improvements Act of 1990, Chairman Joseph R. Biden addressed the
impact of high cost and delays on the American middle class.
Chairman Biden stated, "'[flor the middle class of this country...
the courthouse door is rapidly being slammed shut. Access to the
courts, once available to everyone, has become for middle-class
Americans a luxury that only others can afford."
2 29
While section 3311 does not "re-open the courthouse doors"
which Chairman Biden asserts are being slammed shut, it does, how-
ever, open a different door for parties to enter, in order to solve a
bona fide dispute. Under section 3311, a debtor and creditor can
easily resolve a disputed claim through the simple act of drawing and
negotiating a check containing payment in full language. As Chan-
cellor William D. Hawkland states:
[T]here is much to be said for rules of law that facilitate the
private resolution of disputes. Whatever other merits or
demerits are assigned to the conditioned check, no one can
deny that its use has produced the settlement of many cases
to the great advantage of the commercial world and the
public at large.230
225. See Winston, supra note 4, at 206.
226. See Burke, 802 F. Supp. at 439; see also Hendrick, supra note 55, at
433 ("[T]he use of the full payment check under the common law favors the
private resolution of disputes, ultimately benefiting the public at large.").
227. S. REP. No. 101-416, at 15 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6802, 6809 (quoting Carl Liggio, general counsel for Ernst & Young).
228. See id. at 7.
229. Id. at 6.
230. WilliamD. Hawkland, The Effect of U.C.C. Section 1-207 on the Doc-
trine of Accord and Satisfaction by Conditional Check, 74 COM. L.J. 329, 332
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The application of Commercial Code section 3311 renders a fair re-
suit. It is a convenient and valuable method of dispute resolution.
Equity dictates that a creditor who cashes a payment in full check
should be bound by the terms of the offer.2 3' The debtor's intent is
known, and thus allowing the creditor to cash the check and sue for
the balance--as Civil Code section 1526 allows--seems unfair.
232
Section 1526 allows a creditor to ignore the plain intent of the debtor
and sue for the remainder due under the original debt. 33 It runs
afoul of the well-accepted rule that the offeror (the debtor) is the
master of the offer.
While the common law doctrine of accord and satisfaction codi-
fied in Commercial Code section 3311 results in reduced litigation
and efficient dispute resolution, some have argued that it gives debt-
ors an unfair advantage over creditors.234  Although at first glance
this may appear true, Commercial Code section 3311 does suffi-
ciently protect creditors from overreaching debtors. In order for sec-
tion 3311 to apply, the debtor must act in good faith when tendering
the payment in full check to the creditor, and the amount of the claim
in question must either be unliquidated or subject to a bona fide dis-
pute.235 Thus, if a good faith dispute does not exist as to the amount
due, then the creditor's cashing of a payment in full check for less
then the total amount due will not relinquish the creditor's claim.
23 6
(1969).
231. See Burke, 802 F. Supp. at 439.
232. See id. In other words, "[i]t is unfair to the party who writes the check
thinking that he will be spending his money only if the whole dispute will be
over, to allow the other party, knowing of that reasonable expectation, to wea-
sel around the deal by putting his own markings on the other person's checks."
Id. (quoting 6 ARTHuRL. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1279 (2d. ed. 1962 & Supp.
1999)).
233. See Burke, 802 F. Supp. at 439.
234. See, e.g., Note, Role of the Check in Accord and Satisfaction: Weapon
of the Overreaching Debtor, 97 U. PA. L. REV. 99 (1949).
235. See supra Part III.C.2.
236. See supra Part llI.C.2.a; see also White, supra note 5, at 525.
[An] example of lack of good faith is found in the practice of some
business debtors in routinely printing full satisfaction language on
their check stocks so that all or a large part of the debts of the debtor
are paid by checks bearing the full satisfaction language, whether or
not there is any dispute with the creditor.
CAL. COM. CODE § 3311 cmt. 4 (West Supp. 1999).
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In addition, the burden is on the debtor to prove that the check
or an accompanying document contains a "conspicuous statement
' 237
indicating that the instrument was tendered as full satisfaction of the
claim 2 38  This requirement prevents a debtor from sneaking the
payment in full language past the creditor.
Finally, subsection (c) of Commercial Code section 3311 pro-
vides two additional safeguards to creditors. First, subsection (c)(1)
applies to organizations and states that an accord and satisfaction
does not result if the organization informed the debtor that communi-
cations concerning disputed debts should be sent to a specific person,
office, or place, and the debtor sent this communication elsewhere. 39
Second, subsection (c)(2) applies to any creditor, whether or not an
organization, and provides a ninety-day grace period after the debtor
tenders the check for the creditor to return the check to the debtor
and preserve the claim. 40 Thus, if the creditor accepted the check
inadvertently, section 3311 gives the creditor ninety days to realize
this mistake and return the check to the debtor and preserve the
claim.
One other reason for courts to follow Commercial Code section
3311 as opposed to Civil Code section 1526 is that almost all juris-
dictions have adopted revised Uniform Commercial Code Articles 3
and 4, including section 3-311.24' By adopting the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, California has signed off on the two principle policies
underlying the Code, namely to provide uniform and certain law for
commercial transactions throughout the United States.2 42 Given a
choice of following a non-uniform commercial statute or a uniform
one, California courts should follow the uniform statute.
237. "Conspicuous" statement is defined in Commercial Code section
1201(10). A statement is conspicuous if"it is so written that a reasonable per-
son against whom it is to operate ought to have noticed it" CAL. COM. CODE §
1201(10) (West 1964 & Supp. 1999).
238. See supra Part lm.C.2.a.
239. See supra notes 174-85 and accompanying text.
240. See supra notes 186-88 and accompanying text.
241. As of this writing, only New York, Rhode Island, and South Carolina
have not adopted Revised Articles 3 and 4. See U.C.C. Reporting Service,
State U.C.C. Variation Table xix (March 1999).
242. See U.C.C. § 1-102 (1999); see also Bruce W. Frier, Symposium: One
Hundred Years of Uniform State Laws-Interpreting Codes, 89 MICH. L. REv.
2201 (1991) (comparing policies of the UCC against European uniform codes).
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In summary, Commercial Code section 3311 facilitates infor-
mal, quick, and inexpensive dispute resolution while providing the
necessary safeguards to ensure that creditors are protected from over-
reaching debtors. As noted earlier, section 3311 might be amended
to further facilitate claim resolution, 243 but in its current form it is
superior to the approach taken by Civil Code section 1526.
C. California Case Law
Since Revised Commercial Code sections 1207 and 3311 were
enacted in 1992, we are aware of only two 44 reported cases in which
a court has had to choose which statute(s)-Commercial Code sec-
tion 3311 or Civil Code section 1526-to apply to a payment in full
check. Both cases are from lower federal courts--one a bankruptcy
court decision-and as such are of only persuasive authority in Cali-
fornia. One court applies section 1526 while the other applies sec-
tion 3311. Thus, because binding case law does not exist on this is-
sue, it is still unclear as to which of these conflicting statutes governs
the use of accord and satisfaction checks in California.
1. In re Van Buren Plaza
2 45
a. facts
On June 26, 1992, Van Buren Plaza, LLC, ("Debtor") entered
into a contract for services with Ironstone Group, Inc. ("Credi-
tor").246 The contract stipulated that Creditor was to perform serv-
ices related to reducing the amount of Debtor's property tax liabil-
ity.247 A dispute arose as to whether Debtor owed Creditor for
services rendered for both the 1991 and 1992 tax years, or just for
243. See supra notes 191-197 and accompanying text.
244. One other case, in addition to these two, involves a check issued after
the effective date of California Commercial Code section 3311. The case cites
Civil Code section 1526 but simply states that the check did not contain pay-
ment in full language and therefore did not represent an offer of accord and
satisfaction. See Thompson v. Thompson, 41 Cal. App. 4th 1049, 1059-60, 48
Cal. Rptr. 2d 882, 888 (1996).
245. 200 B.R. 384 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996).
246. See id. at385.
247. See id.
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1991.248 On June 20, 1994, Debtor tendered a check to Creditor for
the exact amount due for only the 1991 tax year.249 On the back of
the check, Debtor printed "Payment in full for all services to date.,
2 50
Before depositing the check, Creditor sent a letter to Debtor protest-
ing the accord and satisfaction language and reserving its right to
pursue the balance that it believed to be due.25 1 After the Debtor ul-
timately filed for bankruptcy, Creditor filed a timely proof of claim
for the balance of its claim.
252
b. discussion
In Van Buren Plaza, the United States Bankruptcy Court, Cen-
tral District of California, stated that the central issue in the case was
to determine the applicable law in California regarding accord and
satisfaction checks.253 In order to resolve this issue, the court had to
first address the following two sub-issues: (1) Did this case present a
bona fide dispute over an unliquidated claim? 254 and (2) Assuming a
bona fide dispute existed, did Creditor properly object to the pay-
ment in full language in reserving its rights?
255
After giving a history of the law of accord and satisfaction in
California up to the enactment of Civil Code section 1526, the court
held that there was a bona fide dispute between Debtor and Credi-
tor.256 The issue then turned to whether Creditor properly objected to
248. See id.
249. See id.
250. Id.
251. See id. at386.
252. See id.
253. See id.
254. The court stated that an unliquidated claim or bona fide dispute between
the parties must exist before an accord and satisfaction can be established. See
id. at 387. This requirement existed under the common law and continues to
exist today under both Commercial Code section 3311 and Civil Code section
1526. See supra Parts UII-T.
255. See Van Buren Plaza, 200 B.R. at386.
256. The court stated that in order to determine whether a bona fide dispute
exists, the test is whether the dispute is honest as opposed to fraudulent See
id. at 387; see also supra notes 37-54 and accompanying text The court de-
termined that a bona fide dispute existed between the parties based on a letter
where Debtor described a conversation between Debtor and Creditor. The let-
ter verified that Debtor signed the contract with the understanding that the
contract only pertained to the 1991 tax year. The letter convinced the court
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the payment in full language in reserving its rights.257 In addressing
this issue, the court relied solely on Civil Code section 1526.258 The
court pointed out that the language in section 1526(a) is somewhat
ambiguous regarding whether the creditor must physically strike the
payment in full notation before negotiating the check in order to re-
serve the creditor's rights.259 Specifically, the court was concerned
with the language in section 1526(a) which allows a creditor to
communicate its intent not to enter into an accord and satisfaction
"[b]y striking out or otherwise deleting" the payment in full nota-
tion.260 The court held that the statutory language, "otherwise delet-
ing," permits the creditor to send a letter to the debtor protesting the
accord and satisfaction, thus reserving the creditor's rights.
261
Because Creditor in this case sent a letter to Debtor protesting
the payment in full language, the court held that Creditor clearly
communicated its intent not to enter into an accord and satisfaction
in accordance with Civil Code section 1526.262 As a result, the court
determined that an accord and satisfaction was not reached and there-
fore Creditor was allowed to assert its claim in bankruptcy.
263
The Van Buren Plaza court chose to follow Civil Code section
1526 without even mentioning Commercial Code sections 3311 and
1207. Since the check was issued in 1994, the provisions of revised
Commercial Code Divisions 1 and 3-specifically, sections 1207
and 3311-applied to the Van Buren Plaza transaction.264  At a
minimum, the court should have addressed the application of
that the Debtor had an honest belief that it did not owe money for the 1992 tax
assessment See Van Buren Plaza, 200 B.R. at 387.
257. See id.
258. See id.
259. See id.
260. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 1526(a) (West Supp.
1999)).
261. See id. In other words, when construing section 1526(a), courts should
not limit it to a literal interpretation. "A literal interpretation might hold that
the statute does not apply in cases where an oral statement separate communi-
cation, or accompanying letter, rather than the check itselt communicates that
the creditor wishes to reject the debtor's offer to settle the claim." Id.
262. See id.
263. See id. at387-88.
264. The California legislature adopted revised UCC §§ 3-311 and 1-207 in
1992. The revised divisions of the California Commercial Code were effective
January 1, 1993. See supra notes 157-66 and accompanying text
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sections 1207 and 3311 to the payment in full check. Perhaps the
lawyers did not call these statutes to the court's attention, or for some
reason the court erroneously thought that Civil Code section 1526
more clearly addressed the situation. If Commercial Code section
3311 had been applied in Van Buren Plaza, as it should have been,
Creditor would not have been allowed to assert its claim in bank-
ruptcy.
265
2. Directors Guild of-America v. Harmony Pictures, Inc.
2 66
a. facts
Directors Guild of America-Producer Pension Plan and the Di-
rectors Guild of America-Producer Health Plan ("DGA") hired an
accounting firm to audit the books and records of Harmony Pictures,
Inc. and Melody Film, Inc. ("HPMF") to determine whether it paid
the proper amount in contributions to DGA's pension and health
plans.267 Based on the accounting firm's findings, on July 23, 1997,
DGA sent a letter to IHPMVIF claiming that HPMF failed to pay or un-
derpaid contributions to its pension and health plans for the audit pe-
riod of June 1, 1990, through May 31, 1994.68
On August 26, 1997, HPMF sent a letter to DGA in an effort to
resolve the dispute as to the amount due.269 The letter stated that
HPMF was enclosing a check for $67,111.6470 as "[f]ull and final
payment and settlement ... for the audit period June 1, 1990[,]
265. Section 3311 gives the creditor the choice of either (1) accepting the
payment in full check and thus releasing the claim, or (2) refusing the check
and preserving the claim. See supra Part I.C.2.a, mI.C.2.b. Under section
3311, because the Creditor in this case accepted the check, an accord and satis-
faction would have been reached and the Creditor would therefore have been
precluded from asserting its claim in bankruptcy.
266. 32 F. Supp. 2d 1184 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
267. See id. at 1186.
268. See id. Specifically, the accounting firm determined that HPMF owed
DGA $67,111.64 in further contributions, $34,037.70 in interest and $8442.90
in audit fees, for a total of $109,592.24. See id. at 1186-87.
269. See id. at 1186.
270. This figure constituted the entire amount of the alleged unpaid contri-
butions but did not include interest and audit fees which DGA had requested.
See id. at 1186-87.
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through May 31, 1994. ,271 On the back of the check, "-IPMF placed
the following notation: 'Full and final settlement for the audit period
6/1/90 to 5/31/94.
''272
On August 27, 1997, DGA sent a letter in response to HPMF's
letter.273 DGA acknowledged receipt of the check, but stated that the
check did not represent full and final settlement.274 However, DGA
did state that HPMF's letter would be presented to the Legal and De-
linquency Committee at their next meeting for final resolution of this
issue.275 DGA informed HPMF that it would be "[n]otified of [the
Committee's] decision in writing immediately thereafter., 276 DGA
then struck out the payment in full language on the check and depos-
ited it into its account.277
On September 15, 1997, almost three weeks after DGA's
August 27, 1997, letter to HPMF, DGA informed HPMF in writing
that the Committee had rejected HPMF's settlement offer.278 "By
the time HIPMF received the letter, it was too late to stop payment on
the [c]heck., 2 79 }LMIF, relying on Commercial Code section 3311,
argued that DGA's acceptance of the check constituted an accord and
satisfaction.280 DGA, however, relied on Civil Code section 1526
and argued that by striking out the payment in full language on the
check, it had preserved the right to litigate the balance of its claim. 28'
b. discussion
The United States District Court for the Central District of Cali-
fornia was thus presented with the same issue that the Van
Buren Plaza court addressed.282 Specifically, the issue was which
271. Id. at 1186.
272. Id. at 1187.
273. See id.
274. DGA claimed that interest of $34,037.70 and audit fees of $8442.90 for
a total of $42,480.60 remained outstanding. See id.
275. See id.
276. Id.
277. See id.
278. See id.
279. Id.
280. See id.
281. See id.
282. See supra Part IV.C.1. However, unlike the Van Buren Plaza court
which only considered section 1526, and ignored the application of section
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provision-Civil Code section 1526 or Commercial Code section
331 1--should govern the treatment of accord and satisfaction checks
in California? 83 In its well-reasoned opinion, the court broke down
its analysis into three parts: (1) Which statute(s) apply to the facts of
this case? (2) If both statutes apply, can they be reconciled? and (3)
If they cannot be reconciled, which provision should control?
284
DGA conceded that HPMF met its burden of establishing that
Commercial Code section 3311 applied.285 However, DGA argued
that Civil Code section 1526(a) also applied and should govern the
dispute.286 HPMF countered by stating that even if section 3311 did
not trump section 1526, section 1526(a) could not be applied because
section 1526(c)-which confirms "an accord and satisfaction where
the check was issued 'in conjunction with a release of a claim"--
was the relevant subdivision that governed this transaction.287
The court relied on Red Alarm, Inc. v. Waycrosse, Inc.,88 to de-
termine whether section 1526(c) applied to this case.2 89 In Red
Alarm, the Ninth Circuit limited the scope of section 1526(c) in order
to protect section 1526(a) from being completely trumped.290 The
court reasoned that "[e]very proposed accord and satisfaction can be
construed to involve a release of the compromised claims. If section
1526(c) is interpreted that broadly, then it will completely vitiate
section 1526(a)."29'
3311, the Directors Guild court analyzed both section 3311 and section 1526,
thus rendering a more complete opinion than the court in the Van Buren Plaza
case.
283. See Directors Guild, 32 F. Supp. 2d at 1189.
284. See id. at 1188-92.
285. See id. at 1189. Both parties agreed that section 3311 subsections (c)
and (d) were not applicable to the facts of this case. See id. For a review of
subsections (c) and (d) see supra notes 173-91 and accompanying text.
286. See Directors Guild, 32 F. Supp. 2d at 1189.
287. Id. -PMF argued that the letter that DGA sent along with the payment
in full check constituted a "release" within the meaning of the statute and
therefore an accord and satisfaction was reached under section 1526(c). See id.
Of course, DGA maintained that the letter did not constitute a "release" and
therefore section 1526(c) did not apply. See id.
288. 47 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 1995). See also supra notes 129-55 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of the Red Alarm case.
289. See Directors Guild, 32 F. Supp. 2d at 1189.
290. See RedAlarm, 47 F.3d at 1003.
291. Directors Guild, 32 F. Supp. 2d at 1189 (quoting Red Alarm, 47 F.3d at
1003).
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The Directors Guild of America court, in analogizing the Red
Alarm facts with the facts of its case, agreed with the Ninth Circuit
opinion that section 1526(c) should be limited in scope.292 The court
reasoned that the language in HPMW's letter offering settlement was
simply just a more elaborate version of what was typed on the back
of the payment in full check.293 The court stated that HPMF's argu-
ment that the letter constituted a release must fail because otherwise
any "debtor could preclude the application of section 1526(a)" sim-
ply by enclosing a letter with the check "stating that the check con-
stituted 'payment in full.' 294 In other words, a broad construction of
section 1526(c) "would eliminate a creditor's ability to preserve its
rights under section 1526(a) by crossing out the notation on the
check. ' 295 Thus, in narrowly construing section 1526(c), the court
stated that the "reference to 'release' must therefore contemplate a
mutual understanding (not necessarily in writing) that was reached
before the debtor issued the check containing the notation. '296 The
court concluded that because DGA and -PMF did not reach a mu-
tual understanding before the issuance of the check, the letter HPMIF
enclosed with the check did not constitute a "release" under section
1526(c), 297 and therefore section 1526(c) did not apply to this trans-
action.298 Therefore, DGA was correct in asserting that while Com-
mercial Code section 3311 applied to the facts of this case, section
1526(a) also applied.299
Because the court concluded that both Civil Code section
1526(a) and Commercial Code section 3311 applied to the facts of
the case, the court shifted its analysis to determine whether these
statutes could be reconciled.300 The court emphasized that the "goal
of statutory construction is to . . . effectuate the intent of the
[l]egislature."30' Whenever reasonably possible, the statutes should
292. See id.
293. See id.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id. (emphasis added).
297. See id. at 1190.
298. See id. at 1192.
299. See id.
300. See id.
301. Id.
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be reconciled. °2 If, however, the two statutes cannot be reconciled,
then effect is given to the more recently enacted law.3°3 The court
first considered the history of section 1526 and section 3311 and
concluded that the legislative history did not establish the legisla-
ture's intent with regard to section 3311 vis-A-vis section 1526.304
The court then considered alternative constructions of the stat-
utes in order to avoid direct conflict.305 I-IPMF wanted section 3311
to apply so that an effective accord and satisfaction would be
reached, and DGA would therefore be precluded from seeking the
balance of its alleged clain 306 In an attempt to reconcile section
3311 with section 1526, I-PMF argued that section 3311 more spe-
cifically applied to the facts of this case.307 Section 1526(a) only
discusses notations on checks and drafts, but does not address those
instances, such as this case, where the debtor sends a letter accompa-
nying the check.30 s Section 3311, however, refers to "'an instrument
or an accompanying written communication"' such as I-PMF's
August 26, 1997, letter, and therefore should apply to this case.
309
The court quickly rejected this argument, pointing out that "nothing
in Civil Code section 1526 precludes its application where" the
check is accompanied by a letter.310 Thus, HPMF's attempt to rec-
oncile the statutes failed.
DGA also proposed an alternative construction of the statutes in
an attempt to reconcile them. DGA wanted section 1526(a) to apply
302. See id.
303. See id.
304. See id. at 1190-91. The court determined that when section 3311 was
enacted in 1992, "nowhere in the [l]egislative history of this 1992 revision did
any legislator or other person expressly mention Civil Code section 1526." Id.
at 1190.
305. See id. at 1191.
306. See id.
307. See id.
308. See id.
309. Id. (second emphasis added).
310. Id. The court reasoned that HPMF's proposed construction of section
1526 "would essentially add the phrase 'unless the check is accompanied by
written correspondence' to section 1526." Id. The court held that this con-
struction would be "contrary to Code of Civil Procedure section 1858" which
states "that when construing a statute, a court should not 'insert what has been
omitted."' Id. (relying on Western/California v. Dry Creek Joint, 50 Cal. App.
4th 1461, 1488, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 220, 236 (1996)).
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because section 1526(a) allows the creditor to cross out the payment
in full language, cash the check, and sue for the balance of the al-
leged claim.3 . DGA argued that section 1526 and section 3311
should be construed together to provide three different protections to
creditors who have received payment in full checks.312 First, Com-
mercial Code section 3311(c) protects a creditor by allowing the
creditor a ninety-day window to return to the debtor a payment in full
check that the creditor inadvertently deposited.1 3 Second, Commer-
cial Code section 3311(c) also protects a creditor by allowing the
"creditor to require that communications regarding disputed debts be
sent to a particular person or place," and if the debtor does not com-
ply with this requirement, "then the claim is not discharged even if
the creditor cashes the check."'3 14 Third, Civil Code section 1526
protects a creditor by allowing a creditor to protest the payment in
full language and avoid an accord and satisfaction.315
The court did not find DGA's argument persuasive.316 The
court reasoned that adopting DGA's construction would undermine
the purpose behind section 3311 of "benefiting debtors and promot-
ing settlements. 31 7 If Civil Code section 1526 was construed with
Commercial Code section 3311 as just another exception, the effect
would be that the "exception would swallow the rule., 318 Creditors
would always "'take the money and run' (to the nearest bank) ...
[and] Commercial Code section 3311 would then have no meaning-
ful function in California. 31 9 Thus, DGA's alternative construction
of the statutes was also rejected.
311. See id.
312. See id.
313. See id.
314. Id.
315. See id.
316. See id.
317. Id.
318. Id. In other words:
What incentive would a creditor, even one who actually knew about
Commercial Code Section 3311, ever have to accept less than full
payment of his claim and forego the rest, if instead he could preserve
the right to threaten suit or even sue for the remainder, merely by
crossing out the notation?
Id.
319. Id.
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The court held that Civil Code section 1526(a) could not be rec-
onciled with Commercial Code section 3311(a) and 3311(b).
320
Thus, in deciding which statute should govern the dispute, the court
gave effect to section 3311 because it was enacted after section
1526.321 Because the court followed section 3311, HPMF's motion
for partial summary judgment was granted and DGA's motion for
partial summary judgment was denied.322 DGA's striking of the
payment in full language on the settlement check constituted an ac-
cord and satisfaction and DGA was therefore precluded from seeking
the alleged balance of the claim.
323
V. CONCLUSION
When a creditor receives a payment in full check, the creditor
should be bound either to reject the check, or by accepting it, accede
to the debtor's terms. A creditor should not be allowed to "accept
the benefit, and reject the condition., 324 This rule existed under the
common law and is supported today by Commercial Code sections
1207 and 3311. However, in California, because Civil Code section
1526 continues to co-exist with the Commercial Code statutes,
creditors can rely on section 1526 and argue that it allows them to
"have their cake and eat it too." In other words, it allows the creditor
to accept the benefit while rejecting the condition. Until Civil Code
section 1526 is repealed, our advice to debtors is that they cannot be
certain that the issuance of a payment in full check to a creditor-and
the creditor's subsequent acceptance of that check-will render an
effective accord and satisfaction, thus relinquishing the balance of
the claim. Therefore, in order for a debtor to protect itself, the debtor
should demand a formal release of the claim from the creditor in ex-
change for the debtor's partial payment.
With regard to creditors, if a court is willing to accept the argu-
ment that Civil Code section 1526 trumps the Commercial Code
statutes, then a creditor can reserve its rights to the balance of the
320. See id. at 1192.
321. See id.
322. See id.
323. See id.
324. Potter v. Pacific Coast Lumber Co., 37 Cal. 2d 592, 599, 234 P.2d 16,
20 (1951).
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claim by simply deleting the payment in full language. However, the
authority for that proposition is slim-a bankruptcy court deci-
sion 32 -and, in our opinion, wrong. In addition, a recent district
court opinion,326 while only persuasive authority, considered both
Civil Code section 1526 and Commercial Code section 3311 to re-
solve the facts of its case, and chose to follow section 331 1.327
Therefore, if a creditor is really concerned about reserving its rights
to pursue the balance of the claim, it should return the check to the
debtor and sue for the total amount believed to be due.
The bottom line is that the California legislature needs to deal
with this inconsistency in the statutes. The legislature should place
California in the mainstream of jurisdictions by repealing Civil Code
section 1526 and leaving Commercial Code section 3311 standing
alone. If anything, Commercial Code section 3311 does not go far
enough in facilitating settlements; it should be amended to require
only good faith on the part of the party seeking settlement and should
not provide the creditor with the option of pursuing the balance of a
claim allegedly due simply because the payment in full check was
sent to the wrong office.
325. See In re Van Buren Plaza, 200 B.R. 384 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996); see
also supra Part IV.B.1.
326. See Directors Guild, 32 F. Supp. 2d at 1192; see also supra Part IV.B.2.
327. See Directors Guild, 32 F. Supp. 2d at 1192.
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